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This authoritative and innovative reader collects twenty-seven articles that are essential for a thorough, comparative, and theoretically-informed approach to the study of race and ethnicity. The international coverage includes the US, UK, Canada, Europe, Asia, and Africa, with a focus on contemporary problems and emerging theoretical issues. Topics include ethnic conflict, migration, citizenship, identity, genocide, transnationalism, and ethnic justice. An introductory essay gives an account of race and ethnicity in contemporary society. The contributors are leading theorists and empirical researchers from around the world. This outstanding collection provides a much-needed international perspective on the current trends, the theoretical base, and the future of racial and ethnic studies.

George Orwell is not generally remembered for his views on strategy. Nevertheless a careful reading of his written work reveals a coherent appreciation of war's strategic dimension. For Orwell, war is a necessary adjunct to politics, and the utility of strategic action should be based on rational considerations of cost and benefit. He rejected pacifism and self-imposed restraints on warfare on the basis that such positions proceeded from unexamined emotional commitments, and were neither instrumentally nor morally sound. He also maintained that the enemy's political values are an essential input into effective strategic calculations. On this latter basis he criticised the strategic prescriptions of H. G. Wells and B. H. Liddell Hart for limited war with Nazi Germany.

Clausewitz has much to tell us about strategy. However, his most fundamental and enduring insights are obscured by his problematic theorizing about war in general. Essentially the same insights have been more clearly and economically articulated in the fields of political philosophy and game theory. As such, these literatures provide a more accessible introduction to the basics of strategy. The real value of Clausewitz resides in his profound understanding of how basic strategic dynamics play out in the specific context of war.

AbstractGeorge Orwell is not generally remembered for his views on strategy. Nevertheless a careful reading of his written work reveals a coherent appreciation of war's strategic dimension. For Orwell, war is a necessary adjunct to politics, and the utility of strategic action should be based on rational considerations of cost and benefit. He rejected pacifism and self-imposed restraints on warfare on the basis that such positions proceeded from unexamined emotional commitments, and were neither instrumentally nor morally sound. He also maintained that the enemy's political values are an essential input into effective strategic calculations. On this latter basis he criticised the strategic prescriptions of H. G. Wells and B. H. Liddell Hart for limited war with Nazi Germany.